Abstract-This paper studies the performance of a Poisson Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET), owned by an Operator, in the presence of a Jammer. The objective of the Jammer is to degrade the spatial performance of the MANET by causing interference, whereas the Operator's objective is to set a Medium Access Probability (MAP) to optimize it. The interaction between the Jammer and the Operator is modeled taking into account the transmission energy costs. This interaction is then transformed into a zero sum game by constructing an anti-potential. First, we assume that the receiver of a node is at a fixed distance. The Nash equilibria is characterized by considering two spatial performance metrics: the number of successful transmissions per unit area which the Operator aims to maximize, and the average delay per unit area which the Operator aims to minimize. We then consider the case where distance between a transmitter and its receiver is not fixed. The Nash equilibria of the resulting game is again characterized.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study an adversarial situation in wireless Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) called the jamming game consisting of two players, namely, an Operator and a Jammer. The objective of the Operator is to maximize a suitably defined spatial performance metric and that of the Jammer is to minimize it. In addition, the players take into account the power consumption disutility incurred in order to achieve the throughput. The jamming game we consider amounts to choosing appropriate medium access probabilities in the presence of the adversary jammer. Viewing the channel and the available transmit power as resources, this jamming game can also be viewed as a resource allocation problem in the presence of an adversary.
Game theory is extensively used to study resource allocation problems in networks [15] . These games often include information theoretic aspects and/or communication theory. In that context, game theory has not only been applied to situations of competition over resources but also to adversarial situations, which can often be modeled as zero-sum games.
It is well known that computing the Nash equilibria in games is in general a hard problem. Indeed, this problem falls into a class of problems introduced by Christos Papadimitriou in 1994, called PPAD (Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed graphs). In view of this complexity, it becomes attractive to identify classes of games for which one may compute the equilibria at a low complexity. We thus study a jamming game under some statistical assumptions on the mobility pattern, which are on one hand reasonable in many real scenarios, and on the other hand, allow for tractable and in several cases, even explicit expressions for the Nash equilibrium.
We consider slotted time, and assume that the mobiles are synchronized. The basic assumptions on our model are
• The location of the transmitters at each time slot forms a homogeneous Poisson point process.
• Mobility is high, so that the location of the mobiles at different slots is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) process.
• Medium access is controlled using Aloha • Transmission success is based on SINR being larger than some threshold.
• Every mobile has always a packet to send.
The geometric aspects of the location of the nodes becomes important when the nodes are mobile; as the interference seen at a given location depends on the relative location of other nodes. In this paper we study a jamming problem in MANETs, in which the locations of the nodes form a homogeneous Poisson point process. We consider two models in Poisson MANETs introduced in [16] . First, we study Poisson bipolar model, in which the distance between the transmitter of a node and its receiver is fixed. We then consider a simple receiver selection model, where it is assumed that the set receivers form another Poisson point process that is independent of the transmitters. Literature on Jamming Games: Jamming are among the first problems involving conflicts in networks that have been modeled and solved using game theory. The first publications on these games go thirty years back with the pioneering work [4] , [5] . The question of the capacity achievable in channels prone to jamming was one of the main concerns, and was thus naturally studied within the information theory community, see e.g. [6] , [7] , [9] . For a recent survey on wireless games that includes jamming games, see [15] . Not only abstract jamming models have been studied using game theory, but also jamming of specific wireless local area networks, see [11] that study the jamming of IEEE 802.11. In some cases an adversary jammer may have access to signalling or information channels, and may be able to harm more by jamming these than by jamming the data transfer itself. Examples are jammers that interfere the signalling protocols, see e.g. [20] who study jamming signalling channels in a cellular network. [10] studies the jamming game in multihop radio networks with ALOHA multiple access scheme and Poisson assumption on the node distribution. The paper considers a scenario in which the network operator aims to maximize the expected forward progress of packets in a given direction, where as a Jammer aims to minimize it. The resulting Nash equilibria of the zero sum game are investigated numerically. Our Contributions:The main contributions of the paper are the following:
• We model a jamming game in the Poisson MANETs with constraints on the transmission energies for both the Jammer and Operator. We introduce an anti-potential that allows us to study the jamming game as a zero-sum game.
• Considering the Poisson bipolar model, we obtain explicit expression for the saddle point of the game by considering utilities based on throughput and delay. We then study the effect of the Jammer transmission power on the equilibrium. We shown that by transmitting at a power higher than certain level, the Operator can operate without the Jammer being active at equilibrium. • In the receiver selection model, we again obtain explicit expression for the saddle point considering throughput as the performance metric. We observe similar behavior as in the case of bipolar model with fixed receiver. The Poisson assumption on the location of nodes allows us to obtain utilities in a surprisingly simple explicit form, which in turn allows us to obtain much insight on the property of the equilibria and on the role of the transmission energy and its cost.
The Poisson assumption is valid when
• the number of mobiles in disjoint sets are independent;
• the number of mobiles in any given set follows a Poisson distribution. This class of point processes maximizes entropy. It is often used for modeling the location of users in e.g. mobile ad hoc networks. In [22] , in the context of cellular networks explicit expression are obtained for coverage and throughput with the Poisson assumption on the base stations. In [19] , we study the Poisson MANET where each node is selfish. The Nash equilibria are characterized by considering the transmission energy costs.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the Poisson MANET model and discusses the performance metrics of interest. In Section III we model the jamming game and characterize the resulting equilibria of the Poisson bipolar model with density of successful transmission and density of delay as performance metrics. In Section IV we consider cases where the distance between a node's transmitter and its receiver is not fixed. Finally, we end with some concluding remarks in Section V. We refer the reader to [21] for all the proofs.
II. MODEL AND SETUP
Consider the simplified mobile ad hoc network (MANET) model called the Poisson bipolar model proposed in [1] . Assume that each node follows the slotted version of the Aloha medium access control (MAC) protocol. Each dipole of the MANET consists of a transmitter and an associated receiver. We assume that each node has an infinite backlog of packets to transmit to its receiver. Nodes are scattered in the Euclidian space according to a homogeneous Poisson point process of intensity 1 . Each node is associated with a multi-dimensional mark that carries information about the transmission status, fading condition, and the distance to receiver. We follow the notation of [3] . LetΦ = { , } ≥1 denote an independently marked Poisson point, where
• Φ = { } ≥1 denotes the Poisson point process of intensity 1 , representing the location of nodes in the Euclidean plane.
• { = ( , )} ≥1 denotes the independent marks of the Poisson point process Φ, which are made of two components: -= { } ≥1 denotes the channel condition between nodes and their associated receivers. It is assumed that channel conditions are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across the nodes with a generic distribution denoted as with mean 1/ . -= { } ≥1 are indicator functions that take value 1 if a given node decides to transmit in a given time slot; otherwise they take value zero. They are assumed to be i.i.d. across the nodes. -The processes , are assumed to be independent of each other.
• We assume that distance between the transmitter and its associated receiver is at a fixed distance . Let ( , ) denote the attenuation function between any two given points , ∈ ℝ 2 . We assume that this function just depends on the distance between points, i.e., | − |. With a slight abuse of notation we denote this function as ( , ) = (| − |). We assume the following form for this attenuation function
The marks { } ≥1 indicate if a given node transmits in a given time slot. Then the probability that the th node transmits is 1 := Pr{ = 1} = [ ] (Medium Access Probability (MAP)). Note that Φ defines a pair of independent Poisson process representing transmitters Φ 1 = { , = 1} and non transmitters Φ 0 = { , = 0} with intensities 1 1 and (1 − 1 ) 1 respectively. We assume that the channel between the receiver of a given node and the transmitter of any other node is also distributed as the random variable . All the nodes transmit at a fixed power denoted as 1 . Signal transmitted by a transmitter located at is successfully received at its associated receiver at location if the signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) at location is larger than some threshold , i.e., := (| − |)
where denotes the thermal noise power at the receiver and Φ 1 denotes the shot noise of the Poisson point process
. Consider a typical node at the origin, 0 = 0 with mark 0 = ( 0 , 0 ). The typical node is said to be covered if (2) holds given that it is a transmitter, i.e, sends some packet. Then the coverage probability of the typical node is
where P 0 denotes the Palm distribution [2] [Chap. I] of the stationary marked Poisson point processΦ. By using Slivnyak's theorem [2] , the coverage probability of a typical node when all other nodes use MAP is evaluated in [1] [3] and denoted as ( , 1 , ).
A. Spatial Performance metrics
Let us assume that all the nodes belong to a single Operator. If the nodes have information about other nodes in their vicinity, they can achieve a better performance by cooperating: Nodes moving from dense clusters to sparse clusters can increase their MAP as chances of collision reduce. Nodes moving from sparse clusters to dense clusters can reduce their MAP as chances of collision increase. We assume that, because of mobility, nodes cannot gather such information in each time slot and transmit with a MAP 1 that is set by the Operator. Then the typical node is a transmitter with probability 1 and a non-transmitter with probability (1 − 1 ). We call the product of the MAP and the coverage probability of the typical node the goodput and denote it as
The set of nodes that transmit in a given slot form another Poisson point process of intensity 1 1 . Let ( 1 ) denote the average number of successful transmissions in a unit area. By Campbell's formula [2] [Sec. 2.1.2] for stationary Poisson point processes this spatial performance metric is given as the product of goodput and the intensity of the Poisson point process, i.e., ( 1 ) = 1 1 ( , 1 1 , ). We shall also consider the mean delay experienced by the nodes in successfully transmitting the packets to their associated receiver. We assume that if a packet transmission fails then the packet is retransmitted till success. We also assume that nodes can resample the channel in each slot. Recall our assumption on the mobility model that locations of the nodes are i.i.d across the time slot. Then by Little's theorem [12] the mean delay for a typical node is given by reciprocal of its goodput given in (4). Let ( 1 ) denote the spatial mean delay of nodes per unit area. Then again using Campbell's formula we get
. We refer to this quantity as spatial density of delay. Note that we used the i.i.d assumption on the nodes realization only to derive the spatial mean delay, and not on the performance metric goodput.
In the following sections we analyze the spatial performance of the network in the presence of a Jammer. In the next section we introduce our game model. We then analyze the jamming game considering the Poisson bipolar model with density of success and density of delay as spatial performance metrics.
III. JAMMING GAME In this section we consider a jamming game in the Poisson bipolar MANET. Assume that there is a Jammer who also has nodes that are scattered according to a Poisson point process in the same geographical area. The Jammer aims to degrade the performance of the Operator by causing interference.
Let 2 denote the intensity of the nodes of the Jammer. The transmitters of the Jammer can re-sample the channel in each time slot and transmit at a fixed power 2 . If a transmitter of the Jammer is surrounded by a dense cluster of nodes belonging to the Operator, then the degradation in performance due to the interference from the Jammer may not be significant; as the success probability is already low. On the contrary, if a transmitter of the Jammer is surrounded by a sparse cluster of nodes belonging to the Operator then, the degradation in performance due to interference from the Jammer could be significant. However, we assume that, due to random mobility, the Jammer cannot gather such information. Also the Jammer incurs costs from the energy transmissions. Thus we assume that the Jammer keeps each of its transmitters turned ON with probability 2 independently of its other transmitters. The transmitters of the Jammer form a Poisson point process of intensity 2 2 .
Recall that 1 denotes the MAP set by the Operator. A transmission of a typical node of the Operator gets interference from all the other nodes that are transmitting. Thus a typical node gets interference from the nodes that form a Poisson point process of intensity 1 1 + 2 2 . In this section we assume that the channel between the receiver of the typical node and transmitters of all other nodes, both the Jammer and the Operator, is distributed according to the random variable and take the same path loss model in (1) . The probability that a transmissions by the typical node is successful in the presence of the Jammer can be easily computed following the same steps as in [1] [ Lemma 3.2] . With some abuse of notation we represent this quantity by ( 1 , 2 ).
Lemma 1: Let each node of the Operator in the Poisson bipolar MANET transmit with MAP 1 and let the Jammer turns ON each of its transmitters with probability 2 . Assume that is Rayleigh distributed with parameter and noise power is zero, then In the following, we consider performance metrics that are a monotonically increasing functions of this success probability. Let ( 1 , 2 ) denote the generic performance metric of the Poisson MANET that the Operator is interested in. In the remaining of the paper when we write a performance metric with two arguments 1 and 2 , it is understood that the it is calculated in the presence of the Jammer who turns ON each of its node with probability 2 , and the nodes of the Operator uses MAP 1 .
From Equation (5) it is clear that the Operator can improve the performance of its nodes by increasing their transmission power, whereas the jammer can decrease it by increasing the transmitting power of its nodes. Thus it is beneficial for both the Operator and the Jammer to increase the transmission power of their nodes. However, we assume that each node incurs a transmission cost due to limited power available to them. The average density of power dissipated among the nodes of the Operator is 1 1 1 and that among the nodes of the Jammer is 2 2 2 . For jamming games with energy constraints in cellular networks see [18] . Let 1 and 2 denote the cost incurred by the Operator and the Jammer per unit power transmitted, respectively. More formally, we define the strategy, utility, and objective of the game between the Jammer and the Operator as following:
Strategy: The strategy of the Operator is to choose a MAP
The objective of the Jammer is to set a probability 2 , with which each of its transmitters is turned ON in a given slot, that minimizes the density of the successful transmission of the Operator taking into account the average transmission costs incurred among its transmitters. We define the utility of the Jammer as
In terms of the optimization problems, we can write the objective of the Operator as to choose a *
and for the Jammer it is to choose a * 2 such that *
Note that the jamming game with the utilities in (6) and (7) is not a zero sum game. This game can be studied as a zero sum game with an anti-potential function obtained by modifying the utilities of the players as below.
Anti potential: If we add the term 2 2 2 2 to the utility function of the Operator, then the set of optimal values * 1 in equation (8) does not change. We define the modified utility function of the Operator as
Similarly, if we add the term 1 1 1 1 to the utility function of the Jammer, then the set of optimal values * 2 in equation (9) does not change. We define the modified utility function of the Jammer as
If we consider a new game with this modified utilities, then the resulting equilibrium, if exits, will be same as in the original game. Notice that the modified utilities are such that 1 (q) = − 2 (q) for all q. Hence, the new game constitutes a zero sum game. In the following subsections we consider performance metrics discussed in Subsection II-A, and analyze the resulting equilibria.
A. Spatial density of Success as performance metric
In this subsection we assume that the Operator is interested in the number of successful transmission per unit area. We refer to this performance metric as density of successful transmissions, and can be computed as
The anti-potential of the jamming game with this performance metric is given by
The following lemma states relevant properties of this antipotential function 1 (q). ( 1 , 2 ) is continuous in both the arguments. The strategy space of both the players is convex and compact. From Lemma 2, and using the Sion's minmax theorem [23] we can readily conclude that the jamming game has a saddle point, i.e., there exists a q
By transforming the jamming game into a zero-sum game we easily concluded that the saddle point of the jamming game exists. We can also explicitly obtain the saddle point as given in the following proposition. The saddle points are characterized in terms of the Lambert function [14] which we denote as ( ).
Proposition 1: Assume that 1 ≥ 1. The Nash equilibrium of the jamming game are as following.
} we have the following cases.
• If 2 2 ≥˜1 1 exp{−˜1 1 } then (˜1, 0) is an equilibrium, where˜1 is given bỹ 1) is an equilibrium, where 1 is given by
One can interpret the results of the above proposition as follows. Under the condition 1 1 ≥ 1 the utility of the Operator is always negative, i.e., the total transmission energy cost for the Operator is high, hence it is optimal for the Operator not to allow any transmissions from its nodes. Once the nodes of the MANET are not active then the Jammer will also turn OFF its transmitter. The condition in the first bullet give a scenario in which the operating cost for the Jammer is too high to allow any transmissions from its nodes. Hence the Jammer keeps all of its nodes turned OFF at equilibrium. The condition in the second bullet gives a scenario in which the transmission costs for the Jammer is low and all the transmitters are turned ON at equilibrium. Equation (13) results in an interior point if
where * 1 is given by Equation (12) . Let us proceed to study the effect of power and cost factors on the equilibria. Let * 1 ( 2 ) denote the best response of the Operator when the Jammers' strategy is 2 . From Equation (26) it is easy to note that the best response of the Operator is a decreasing function in 2 . Hence 1 ≤ * 1 ( 2 ) ≤˜1 for all 2 ∈ (0 1). Where˜1 is the best response when 2 = 0, and 1 is the best response when 2 = 1. To understand the bounds on the product 2 2 given in Proposition 1 more clearly, let us define a function : [0, 1] → ℝ + given by ( ) = 1 exp{− 1 }. The function attains maxima at = 1/ 1 , and is increasing in the interval [0, 1/ 1 ]. Thus it is clear that
This verifies the consistency of the bounds on 2 2 given in Proposition 1 and are shown in Figure 1 .
Note that the upper bound and lower bound on 2 2 in Proposition 1 that determines the value of equilibrium ( 1 , 2 ) are functions of the power transmitted by the Jammer and the operator. In Figure 2 , we show the variations of ( 1 ) exp{− 2 } and (˜1) as a function of 2 for a given value of system parameters, price factors, and the power 1 transmitted by the nodes of the Operator. In the region marked , 2 satisfies the relation If the power transmitted by the Jammer lies in this region, then, at equilibrium, all the nodes of the Jammer are turned OFF. In the region marked , 2 satisfies the relation
If the power transmitted by the Jammer lies this region , then the Jammer turns ON each of its nodes with probability that is an interior point at equilibrium. In Figure 3 , we plot the best response (BR) of the Jammer and the Operator. We choose one power level, 2 , for the Jammer from each of the region , , and , with the power level for the Operator fixed at the same value as that used in Figure 2 . In Figure 3 the blue lines correspond to the best response of the Operator, and the red lines correspond to that of the Jammer. The equilibrium for the corresponding value of 2 are marked.
Nullifying the Jamming effect:For a given power level and the cost factor of the Jammer if the condition 2 2 ≥ (˜1) holds at equilibrium, then the Operator sees no Jamming effect as all the nodes of the Jammer are turned OFF. Thus it is interesting for the Operator to choose a power level such that the Jammer turns OFF its nodes at equilibrium. It is easy to note the (˜1) is a decreasing function in 1 . Indeed, (˜1) is a decreasing function in 1 as˜1 is less than ≤ 1/ 1 and decreasing in 1 (see Equation (10)). Hence the product (˜1) is also decreasing in 1 . Thus the Operator can increase his power level, say to * 1 , such that 2 2 ≥ (˜1), and operate without the Jamming effect at equilibrium. However, the Operator can do so provided its cost factor is such that 1 * 1 ≤ 1. 
B. Spatial density of delay as performance metric
In this section we assume that that the Operator aims to minimize the spatial density of delay, whereas the Jammer aims to maximize it. From the arguments in Subsection II-A, we can write the spatial density of delay as the reciprocal of the spatial density of success. Continuing the set up used in the jamming game model, we write the performance metric and the resulting anti-potential as
and
The following lemma states the properties of this anti-potential function. 
From the above lemma we see that the hypothesis of Sion's minmax theorem [23] holds. Hence the Nash equilibrium exists. The following proposition characterizes the Nash equilibria.
Proposition 2: Assume that 1 ≥ 1.
• Let 1 be the solution of
and 1) is the Nash equilibrium.
• Let˜1 be the solution of
The proof follows by noting that − 1 ( 1 , 2 ) is convex in 2 and hence maximized at the extreme points.
IV. RECEIVER SELECTION MODELS
In the Poisson bipolar model of the last section we assumed that the receiver of a node is at a fixed distance. In this section we relax this condition. We consider two models for receiver selection introduced in [16] [Ch 17], namely, independent nearest receiver (INR) model and MANET nearest receiver (MNR) model.
A. Independent Nearest Receiver model
In the INR model we assume that the potential receivers form a Poisson point process Φ 0 of intensity 0 and is independent of the Poisson point process Φ. Each active node of the Operator aims to transmit to the receiver that is nearest to it. Let the random variable denote the distance between a typical node at the origin and to its nearest receiver. The probability density function of , denoted as , is given by 
( ). Let 1 and 2 denote the cost factor of the Operator and Jammer respectively. We define the utility of the Operator and the Jammer with the energy cost as
respectively. As in Section III, by adding 2 2 2 2 to Equation (17) and 1 1 1 1 to Equation (18), we have an antipotential function given by
B. MANET nearest receiver model
In the MNR model we assume that each transmitter picks the nearest node of Φ that is not active in the considered time slot. Let the Operator choose the MAP 1 . Then the receivers form a Poisson point process Φ 0 of intensity (1 − 1 ) 1 which is independent of the set of transmitters. Let (MNR, 1 , 2 ) denote the density of successful transmissions of the nodes of the Operator when the Jammer turns ON each of its nodes with probability 2 . We have [16] [Eq. 17.6]
with 0 = (1 − 1 ) . We define the utility of the Operator with transmission cost as
Comparing Equation (17) with Equation (21) we observe that both the utility functions have the same structure. Henceforth we restrict our analysis of the jamming problem to the case of INR model.
Saddle Point: It is clear that the anti-potential function 1 (INR, 1 , 2 ) is a concave function in the strategy of the Operator and a convex function in the strategy of the Jammer. Then we can directly apply Sion's minimax theorem to conclude that Saddle point of the Jamming game exists. The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium in the INR receiver selection model.
Proposition 3:
The Nash equilibrium of the jamming game are as following. If 1 1 ≥ 1, then (0, 0) is an equilibrium. If 1 1 < 0 /( 1 2 + 0 ) we have the following cases.
• If 2 2 ≥ 1 0˜1 1 ( 1˜1 1 + 0 ) 2 then (˜1, 0) is an equilibrium, where˜1 is given bỹ (25) Note that, unlike in Proposition 1 we did not put the restriction 1 1 ≥ 1 in the above proposition. However, for Equation (24) and (25) to result in an interior point we need the conditions 0 2 2 ≤ 1 1 ( 2 2 + 1 1 ) 2 , and 1 2 1 1 Figure 4 shows the bound on 2 2 as given in Proposition 3. This has similar shape as that in 2. Hence, we can infer the same kind of results for the INR receiver selection model as in the fixed distance receiver model.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Geometric considerations play a very central role in wireless communications, since the attenuation of wireless channels strongly depend on the distance between transmitter and receiver. Models that take into account the exact location of mobiles are often too complex to analyze or to optimize. Our objective in this paper is to analyze the performance of Poisson MANET in the presence of an adversarial Jammer considering the costs incurred in energy transmission. Our assumption of Poisson distribution on node locations lead to explicit expression for Nash equilibria. We analyzed the performance of the Network at equilibrium as a function of the transmission costs.
More structured point processes can also be contemplated, for instance exhibiting attraction (hot spots) or repulsion (more elaborate medium access control than Aloha like e.g. CSMA). We leave the analysis of medium access games under such point processes for future research.
